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Governing Nature Conservation in Political 
“Hotbeds”: A Contractual Approach 
 




The implementation of nature conservation initiatives is one of the major 
factors in successfully securing sustainability. According to social science 
literature, bottom-up approaches1 that build on community engagement are 
preferred over top-down approaches because the establishment of nature 
conservation relies on mutual agreement and non-opportunistic behavior of the 
parties concerned. This preference is particularly notable in political “hotbeds” 
with weak governmental enforcement. The success of bottom-up approaches 
depend heavily on how the governance arrangements concerning nature 
conservation initiatives incentivize the commitment and trust of the stakeholders 
involved. This study explores what types of governance frameworks are 
appropriate to establish commitment and trust in bottom-up nature conservation. 
This paper also investigates whether private law theories on contractual 
governance, namely contractual networks, can establish the basis for a governance 
framework in private relationships. Contractual networks are hybrid forms of 
organizations located between markets and hierarchies.2 “They are created to 
coordinate activities by legally independent parties who cooperate to achieve a 
common objective without creating a new corporate entity.”3 We will demonstrate 
that the theory related to the governance of contractual networks has the potential 
to form such an effective framework. 
 
 * Ph.D. candidate Wageningen University. The authors acknowledge the 
discussions with various colleagues, in particular Kris van Koppen, Koen Arts, and Hanna 
Schebesta, that have helped to shape the ideas of this paper. The research was funded by a 
grant from the Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education. 
 ** Associate Professor of Law at Wageningen University and Distinguished 
International Visitor, Erasmus University of Rotterdam. 
1. Bottom-up approaches are characterized by a coordination of a web of individuals. 
2. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, AM. ECON. REV., May 2005, 
at 1, 3–4. 
3. Fabrizio Cafaggi, Contractual Networks and Contract Theory: A Research 
Agenda for European Contract Law, in CONTRACTUAL NETWORKS, INTER-FIRM 
COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 66, 66 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2011). 
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Nature conservation initiatives play a pivotal role to the protection of 
biodiversity.4 “[M]ost areas considered to be high-priority diversity ‘hot spots’ 
(Myers 1988; Myers et al. 2000) are also social and political ‘hotbeds.’”5 Political 
‘hotbeds’ are “rural areas in countries such as Colombia, Brazil, Madagascar, 
Tanzania, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Ivory Coast which often feature high levels 
of poverty, insecure land tenure and landlessness, unstable and/or undemocratic 
political systems, and histories of state-sponsored repression.”6 The absence of 
effective public institutional governance frameworks limit the possibilities for 
effective state-centered governance arrangements, to the benefit of nature 
conservation in such “hotbeds.”7 As a consequence, arrangements increasingly 
focus on the introduction of more participatory bottom-up methods. As these 
arrangements hence focus more as social institutions, the existence of social 
mechanisms such as trust among the actors are pivotal for the success of 
decentralized bottom-up approaches.8 Decentralized bottom-up approaches 
delegate rights and responsibilities away from the state, to the local level.9 The 
bottom-up approach involves stakeholders such as local communities and 
governmental and nongovernmental entities, in a collective action, to establish 
nature conservation initiatives. Some of these bottom-up approaches establish 
 
4. Hubert Job et al., Protected Areas in a Neoliberal World and the Role of Tourism 
in Supporting Conservation and Sustainable Development: An Assessment of Strategic 
Planning, Zoning, Impact Monitoring, and Tourism Management at Natural World Heritage 
Sites, 25 J. SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 1697, 1697–98 (2017); Nahieli Manjarrez-Bringas et al., 
Lessons for Sustainable Development: Marine Mammal Conservation Policies and Its 
Social and Economic Effects, 10 SUSTAINABILITY 1, 9 (2018); Yves M. Zinngrebe, 
Conservation Narratives in Peru: Envisioning Bodiversity in Sustainable Development, 21 
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 1, 1–23 (2016). 
5. Steven R. Brechin et al., Beyond the Square Wheel: Toward a More 
Comprehensive Understanding of Biodiversity Conservation as Social and Political 
Process, 15 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 41, 42 (2002).  
6. Id. at 42–43. 
7. Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 1, 1–27 
(2002) (on the difference between state-centred and de-centred regulation and their 
implication). 
8. INGVILD H. T. HARKES, FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT, THE ROLE OF LOCAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND DECENTRALISATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO 
MARINE SASI IN CENTRAL MALUKU, INDONESIA 250–51 (Institute of Environmental Sciences 
ed., 2006). 
9. Svein Jentoft et al., Social Theory and Fisheries Co-Management, 22 MARINE 
POL’Y 423, 423 (1998).  
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nature conservation initiatives through contractual arrangements.10 For example, in 
Raja Ampat, Indonesia, a local conservation practice known as sasi, which 
formally involves institutions and stakeholders traditionally not involved in sasi—
such as the church, business, government, and nongovernmental organizations—
has proven to be an effective component of marine resource conservation.11 In this 
paper, we investigate whether contractual governance theory can serve as an 
effective regulatory framework to govern bottom-up initiatives. Contractual 
governance describes the theory surrounding private ordering, “which entails 
efforts by the immediate parties to a transaction to align incentives and to craft 
governance structures that are better attuned to their exchange needs.”12 
Contractual networks describes the sum of the contractual relationships 
between the several stakeholders which are bound together to achieve a common 
objective. From a legal perspective, the management of bottom-up nature 
conservation is embedded into a complex network of contractual arrangements.13 
These govern not only the respective parties, but also third parties, such as the 
governing state.14 From a regulatory perspective, these contracts are created to 
coordinate the activities of otherwise legally independent parties; their purpose is 
to accomplish the common objective of nature conservation without creating a new 
corporate entity. Due to these features, we argue that the management of bottom-
up nature conservation satisfies the requirements of a contractual network and 
should be analyzed as such. 
Contractual networks require governance devices to monitor and steer the 
web of relationships.15 Several designs of contractual network exist. They 
specifically take the form of either formal or informal contracts,16 or relational 
 
10. Sepus M. Fatem et al., Camouflaging Economic Development Agendas with 
Forest Conservation Narratives: A Strategy of Lower Governments for Gaining Authority 
in the Re-Centralising Indonesia, 78 LAND USE POL’Y 699, 700 (2018); Endang Gunaisah 
et al., Socio-Economic and Cultural Sustainability in Local Wisdom Management at Local 
Marine Conservation Area (KKLD) of Mayalibit Bay, Raja Ampat Regency, West Papua 
Province, 9 AQUACULTURE, AQUARIUM, CONSERVATION & LEGIS.-INT’L J. BIOFLUX SOC’Y 
(AACL BIOFLUX) 901, 905 (2016).  
11. Elizabeth McLeod et al., Sasi and Marine Conservation in Raja Ampat, 
Indonesia, 37 COASTAL MGMT. 656, 673 (2009). 
12. Oliver E. Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From 
Choice to Contract, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 171, 172 (2002). 
13. See McLeod et al., supra note 11, at 673. 
14. Id. 
15. See Cafaggi, supra note 3, at 76–77. 
16. Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 720–25 
(1973). 
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contracts where compliance is primarily built on mutual trust.17 Trust-related 
features can also work as a regulative tool, by which they contribute, inter alia, to 
the creation of trust and incentivize wanted behavior.18 This regulatory function, 
generally speaking, combined with the trust-creating feature of contract 
governance, make it particularly interesting for our type of study. As was shown in 
the example of marine sasi fishery systems in Indonesia, “the real ‘glue’ that keeps 
an institution [such as a nature conservation initiative] alive over time are the social 
mechanisms, i.e., trust, legitimacy, and transparency.”19 Contractual networks can 
deliver trust, legitimacy and transparency, while acting largely in the absence of 
state enforcement mechanisms. For this reason, they may be the ideal arrangement 
for the governance of nature conservation initiatives in political and social 
“hotbeds.”  
In order to investigate whether such contractual networks are a good 
governance tool for establishing trust in bottom-up initiated nature conservation, 
we first discuss the theoretical literature on the effectiveness of bottom-up versus 
top-down initiated nature conservation. To this end, we evaluate the empirical 
literature on the effectiveness of bottom-up initiated nature conservation in the 
second section. Both strands of literature illustrate the need for governance by way 
of bottom-up approaches and trust-building measures. In the third section, we will 
link the outcome of the literature review to insights coming from relational contract 
theory and contractual network. We will show that both approaches share essential 
features with the governance requirements of bottom-up approaches towards the 
governance of nature conservation. And as such, can provide a good analytical 
framework for the governance of nature conservation in political “hotbeds.” 
However, empirical research into the effectiveness of the regulatory tools of 
network contracts is largely absent. Therefore, we call for more empirical research 
 
17. Mathew Boyle, The Relational Principle of Trust and Confidence, 27 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 633, 633–57 (2007); Nuno Gil et al., Trust in Relational Contracting and as a 
Critical Organizational Attribute, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
(Peter W. G. Morris et al. eds., 2011).  
18. Fernando Gómez, Cooperation, Long-Term Relationships and Open-Endedness 
in Contractual Networks, in CONTRACTUAL NETWORKS, INTER-FIRM COOPERATION AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 21, 24 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2011); Jeffrey L. Bradach & Robert G. 
Eccles, Price, Authority, and Trust: From Ideal Types to Plural Forms, 15 ANN. REV. SOC. 
97, 97–118 (1989); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 62–67 (1963); Arif Satria et al., Contractual 
Solution to the Tragedy of Property Right in Coastal Fisheries, 30 MARINE POL’Y 226, 226–
36 (2006) (illustrating how contractual arrangements can incentivize sustainable behavior 
in the fisheries sector). 
19. See HARKES, supra note 8, at 250–51.  
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to investigate whether the tools of contractual network governance can be used to 
successfully govern nature conservation in political and social “hotbeds.” 
 
II. Bottom-up vs. top-down approach to natural resources 
governance in “hotbeds” and the need for governance, 
engagement, and trust 
 
The following section is an overview of findings in the literature on the 
effectiveness of bottom-up approaches. We illustrate, based on selected examples, 
how the discussion in the literature developed to identify the “trust problem” of the 
governance of nature conservation initiatives. First, we analyze the pertinent 
theoretical literature, and then empirical research. 
 
A. A review of theoretical literature 
 
Early literature broadly highlighted the problems with bottom-up 
approaches, focusing on the identification and structure of the challenges. Whereas 
later literature concerned the evaluation of the execution of remedial measures. 
Some of the concerns illustrated by earlier literature include: participation,20 
access,21 authority,22 power,23 and cooperation.24 
Communities’ participation in natural resource governance can be described 
as a spectrum25 with a varying degree of the involvement of the State—with 
government-centralized management as the strongest involvement, co-
management in the middle and community-self management representing least 
involvement.26 Co-management covers a different level of communities’ 
participation, power sharing, and integration of local and government-centralized 
management systems27 The spectrum of co-management ranges from simple 
 
20. Robert S. Pomeroy & Fikret Berkes, Two to Tango: The Role of Government in 
Fisheries Co-Management, 21 MARINE POL’Y 465, 465–68 (1997). 
21. Jesse C. Ribot & Nancy Lee Peluso, A Theory of Access, 68 RURAL SOC. 153, 
153–81 (2003).  
22. Thomas Sikor & Christian Lund, Access and Property: A Question of Power and 
Authority, 40 DEV. & CHANGE 1, 1–22 (2009). 
23. Max Krott et al., Actor-Centred Power: The Driving Force in Decentralized 
Community Based Forest Governance, 49 FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 34, 34–42 (2014). 
24. Carina Cavalcanti et al., Public Participation and Willingness to Cooperate in 
Common-Pool Resource Management: A Field Experiment with Fishing Communities in 
Brazil, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 613, 613–22 (2010). 
25. Pomeroy & Berkes, supra note 20, at 466. 
26. Id. at 466. 
27. Id. 
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information regimes, cooperation to community control and inter-area 
coordination.28 However, there is neither a clear line between points on the 
spectrum, nor does the spectrum work towards a static point due to the social, 
political, and cultural factors that influence community participation.29 For 
instance, one study suggested that stakeholders are most likely to participate if they 
are the ones who will be economically and socially better off, and have preexisting 
links to authorities and information by authorities.30 Conversely, another study 
argues that participation is related to cooperation.31 This study reveals that the 
willingness to cooperate in such conservation initiatives is influenced by 
communities’ participation, leadership, and the belief of others’ cooperation 
influence.32 
“Access studies” describes research that examines how stakeholders have, 
obtain, and retain benefits of available natural resources.33 Access studies 
differentiate two kinds of access mechanisms, which are termed “rights-based” and 
“structural-relational-based.” The rights-based mechanism relates to granting 
access by means of the law, rules, and regulations. Conversely, structural-relational 
mechanisms grant access to natural resources by use of tools such as technology, 
information, knowledge, capital, social relation, and self-identity.34 It is difficult to 
distinguish both mechanisms since they are interconnected with one another. Sikor 
and Lund’s study provides a richer theory on exercising access to natural resources 
that is not exclusively defined by property rights but also includes authority which 
influences the process of legitimacy.35 Sikor and Lund’s perspective widens the 
view towards natural resources governance to include property and authority in the 
legitimacy processes. According to Sikor and Lund’s study, legitimacy is not static. 
Rather, it is evolving and creates contracts that are influenced by socio-political 
and even cultural aspects.36 Accordingly, recent researchers witnessed a wide 
involvement of stakeholders, including the state. The state together with other 
stakeholders exercise control via power plays.37 The study of power cited in the 
 
28. Pomeroy & Berkes, supra note 20, at 466–68. 
29. Id. 
30. Arun Agrawal & Krishna Gupta, Decentralization and Participation: The 
Governance of Common Pool Resources in Nepal’s Terai, 33 WORLD DEV. 1101, 1110–11 
(2005). 
31. Cavalcanti et al., supra note 24, at 619–20. 
32. Id. 
33. See Ribot & Peluso, supra note 21, at 154–55. 
34. See Ribot & Peluso, supra note 21, at 162–72. 
35. See Sikor & Lund, supra note 22, at 1–7. 
36. See Sikor & Lund, supra note 22, at 6–7. 
37. Krott et al., supra note 23, at 35–36; Jane Mansbridge, The Role of the State in 
Governing the Commons, 36 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 8, 8–10 (2014).  
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previous footnote emphasizes that the power play between stakeholders is a crucial 
factor to take into account in decentralized forest governance.38 Moreover, this 
literature defines the elements of power as coercion (force), (dis)incentives, and 
dominant information.39 Mansbridge’s study provides another perspective on 
stakeholders and their power plays.40 This study stipulates the state plays a 
significant role in governing natural resources. Specifically, the localized 
governance is nested in higher institutions.41  
Contemporary literature focuses on the evaluation of the correct 
implementation tools. Early literature introduced the need to take into account 
complexity of the society and the cross-scale interaction between them in natural 
resource governance.42 Due to the intersection between society and natural 
resources governance, local knowledge needs to be implemented to enable 
cooperative processes. Furthermore, several factors encourage stewardship and 
build mutual trust which are implementation of solutions at the local level, equity 
and empowerment as a part of multidimensional incentives, and the sharing of 
power and of responsibility.43 Similarly, some proponents of bottom-up nature 
conservation advance the co-management strategies previously introduced, namely 
simple information regimes, cooperation to community control and inter-area 
coordination. These strategies emphasize engaging local stakeholders in different 
aspects and to various extents.44 We argue that co-management will likely be the 
best way to meet the intended goals of conservation while also meeting social and 
ecological goals because capabilities to adjust social, economic and institutional 
condition that fit the need of the locals.45 An empirical assessment concerning 
communal farmers in Namibia and South Africa has revealed that challenges of 
compliance and efficiency can be dealt with when rules are not in conflict with 
local norms.46 A similar assessment on compliance also highlights the need for 
adaptive co-management. Co-management of this nature allows for renegotiation 
and adaptation, which is highly beneficial. Accordingly, another study on forest 
users groups in Bolivia also provided evidence for the importance of local self-
 
38. Krott et al., supra note 23, at 35.  
39. Krott et al., supra note 23, at 37–39. 
40. See Mansbridge, supra note 37, at 8–10. 
41. Mansbridge, supra note 37, at 9–10. 
42. Fikret Berkes, Rethinking Community-Based Conservation, 18 CONSERV. BIOL’Y 
621, 623–24 (2004).  
43. Id. at 629. 
44. See Pomeroy & Berkes, supra note 20, at 468–71.  
45. Joshua E. Cinner et al., Co-management of Coral Reef Social-Ecological 
Systems, 109 PROC. NAT. ACAD’Y SCI. U.S.A. 5219, 5222 (2012). 
46. Bjórn Vollan et al., Co-Managing Common-Pool Resources: Do Formal Rules 
Have to Be Adapted to Traditional Ecological Norms?, 95 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 51, 62 (2013). 
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organized rule-making and sanctioning in assuring cooperation and compliance.47 
In order to effectively achieve such engagement of local stakeholders, studies have 
shown that it is essential to understand the socio-cultural context before 
engagement starts.48  
To summarize, many scholars propose bottom-up approaches for 
establishing and managing natural resources because many cases have shown more 
success with this model than top-down regulation.49 However, upon closer 
examination, the empirical literature reveals mixed success stories.50 Important 
determinants for the success of nature management are, in particular, the chosen 
aspect of community involvement,51 the acquisition of access,52 and willingness to 
cooperate.53 Other important determinants include the existence of functioning 
rules, cooperation,54 legitimation, and equitability.55 As a consequence, the success 
of bottom-up approaches to nature conservation requires effective governance. As 
a result, many observers quickly emphasize the need of government control to 
ensure long-term sustainability of bottom-up nature conservation activities.56 In 
their view, such a state centered perspective is required in order to prevent a 
backlash of conservation goals behind other community demands57 or to enable 
cooperation and establish leadership among diverse stakeholders.58 However, all 
too often, scholars overlook the fact that governmental control is particularly 
difficult to establish in political “hotbeds.” 
So far, scholars have not developed a governance framework that is feasible 
for nature conservation in political “hotbeds.” Research has shown that nature 
 
47. Krister Andersson et al., Institutional Diversity and Local Forest Governance, 
36 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 61, 62 (2014). 
48. Eleanor J. Sterling et al., Assessing the Evidence for Stakeholder Engagement in 
Biodiversity Conservation, 209 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 159, 162–66 (2017). 
49. Arun Agrawal, Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of 
Resources, 29 WORLD DEV. 1649, 1650 (2001). 
50. Sterling et al., supra note 48, at 166–67; Berkes, supra note 42, at 622. 
51. See Pomeroy & Berkes, supra note 20, at 468. 
52. See Ribot & Peluso, supra note 21, at 172–74; Sikor & Lund, supra note 22, at 5. 
53. See Cavalcanti et al., supra note 24, at 620; Agrawal & Gupta, supra note 30, at 
1110–11. 
54. See Vollan et al., supra note 46, at 60. 
55. See Andersson et al., supra note 47, at 70. 
56. Edward J. Hind et al., From Community-Based to Centralised National 
Management–A Wrong Turning for the Governance of the Marine Protected Area in Apo 
Island, Philippines?, 34 MARINE POL’Y 54, 55 (2010).  
57. Id. 
58. Marc J. Stern et al., The Goals and Challenges of the March 30-31, 2001 Yale 
ISTF Conference Entitled: Transboundary Protected Areas: The Viability of Regional 
Conservation Strategies, 17 J. SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY 1, 4 (2003). 
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conservation cannot just be governed by public institutions, but must also be 
adequately supported by social mechanisms that will ensure “legitimacy, trust, 
collaboration and transparency.”59 Out of these four elements, theorists60 and 
empiricists61 have identified the building of trust between stakeholders as a major 
factor in determining: social capital, cooperation, participation, as well as the 
success of natural resource governance. 
 
B. A review of empirical literature. 
 
This section introduces empirical findings on the effectiveness of bottom-up 
approaches to the governance of natural resources. We will illustrate that 
participation in decision making, information sharing, and trust as the key factors 
in establishing successful nature conservation initiatives. The population size 
determines what form of participation will occur, and compliance defines the 
effectiveness of nature conservation initiatives. The discussion of natural resources 
management in disciplines such as marine, freshwater, forest, or across these 
disciplines (marine-forest or landscape scale) cover three types of approaches to 
the governance of natural resources, namely top-down, bottom-up, and co-
management (which is a middle ground between top-down and bottom-up). Nature 
conservation initiatives can seldom rely on complete ecological data.62 Complex 
societal issues make the estimation of an optimal solution for each one involved 
 
59. HARKES, supra note 8, at 249.  
60. Kimberly Coleman & Marc J. Stern, Exploring the Functions of Different Forms 
of Trust in Collaborative Natural Resources Management, 31 SOC’Y & NAT. RES. 21, 21–
38 (2018); Bart Nooteboom et al., Effects of Trust and Governance on Relational Risk, 40 
ACAD’Y MGMT. J., 308, 308–38 (1997). 
61. Birgit I. de Vos & Jan P. M. van Tatenhove, Trust Relationship Between Fishers 
and Government: New Challenges for the Co-Management Arrangements in the Dutch 
Flatfish Industry, 35 MARINE POL’Y 218, 220 (2011); Michael J. Manfredo et al., Values, 
Trust, and Cultural Backlash in Conservation Governance: The Case of Wildlife 
Management in the United States, 214 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 303, 310 (2017); Landon 
Yoder & Rinku Roy Chowdhury, Tracing Social Capital: How Stakeholder Group 
Interactions Shape Agricultural Water Quality Restoration in the Florida Everglades, 77 
LAND USE POL’Y 354, 360 (2018); Lucia Ordoñez-Gauger et al., It’s a Trust Thing: 
Assessing Fisherman’s Perceptions of the California North Coast Marine Protected Area 
Network, 158 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 144, 152 (2018). 
62. David R. Smith et al., Developing a Landscape-Scale, Multi-Species, and Cost-
Efficient Conservation Strategy for Imperiled Aquatic Species in the Upper Tennessee River 
Basin, USA, 27 AQUATIC CONSERVATION: MARINE & FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS 1224, 1225 
(2017). 
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almost impossible.63 However, empirical studies may nonetheless provide valuable 
insights on the effective governance arrangements in several cases.  
Within the marine discipline, scholars discussed several key aspects for the 
success of marine conservation. Participation in decision making,64 information 
sharing, and trust65 are among the key aspects. For example, different sets of ideas, 
specifically the experience and beliefs of each stakeholder influence participation 
in marine conservation in the Philippines.66 This case also shows that adherence to 
the rules of the game and the communication of a clear objective from the outset 
are essential.67 However, it is notable that the quality of the communication 
strategies matter as well. In a case study in Galapagos, local actors did not 
participate in decision making, resulting in continuous conflict.68 This case study 
illustrates the need for internal consultation and a feedback strategy for the 
successful implementation of nature conservation.69 Additionally, population size 
influences the form of participation.70 On Galapagos the size of the relevant 
population represented had an impact on the responsible representative’s form of 
participation.  
Compliance is a major factor in effectively establishing nature conservation 
initiatives.71 Traditionally, compliance is achieved by state-centered top-down 
approaches involving coercion. However, top-down approaches are costly and 
ineffective due to many factors, such as low compliance and a high risk of conflict. 
Decentralized bottom-up approaches delegate rights and responsibility away from 
the state to the local level.72 Such bottom-up approaches decrease costs and 
 
63. Christine Rockmann et al., Stakeholder Participation in Marine Management: 
The Importance of Transparency and Rules for Participation, in CONSERVATION FOR THE 
ANTHROPOCENE OCEAN 289, 289 (Phillip S. Levin & Melissa R. Poe ed., 2017).  
64. Richard B. Pollnac et al., Discovering Factors That Influence the Success of 
Community-Based Marine Protected Areas in the Visayas, Philippines, 44 OCEAN & 
COASTAL MGMT. 683, 707 (2001). 
65. Rodrigo Oyanedel et al., Establishing Marine Protected Areas through Bottom-
Up Processes: Insight from Two Contrasting Initiatives in Chile, 26 AQUATIC 
CONSERVATION: MARINE & FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEM 184, 193 (2016).  
66. See Rockmann et al., supra note 63, at 303. 
67. Rockmann et al., supra note 63 at 303. 
68. Id. at 205. 
69. Pippa Heylings & M. Bravo, Evaluating Governance: A Process for 
Understanding How Co-Management Is Functioning, and Why, in the Galapagos Marine 
Reserve, 50 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 174, 188–89 (2007). 
70. Pollnac et al., supra note 64, at 706. 
71. Timothy R. McClanahan et al, A Comparison of Marine Protected Areas and 
Alternative Approaches to Coral-Reef Management, 16 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1408, 1411 
(2006).  
72. See Jentoft et al., supra note 9, at 423–24.  
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conflicts while also promoting compliance.73 A freshwater conservation study in 
South Africa provides a valuable lesson on how top-down conservation targets and 
bottom-up implementation feedbacks are interdependent. Systematic feedback 
requires systemic conservation governance.74 Hence, conservation efforts are 
aligned across the vertical and horizontal dimension.75 In this manner, conservation 
activities are characterized by the involvement of different stakeholders at different 
levels, including third parties like brokers and scientists.76 Knowledge, 
relationships, and facilitation skills are important in building a broad network of 
stakeholders.77  
In forest management, individual and social identities influence participation 
in forest governance.78 Across the tropics, community-managed forests show lower 
rates of deforestation.79 Local forest governance with high community involvement 
in organizing, ruling, and sanctioning results in more effective management.80 If a 
forest is primarily state-owned, like in the tropics for example, scholars have shown 
that hybrid governance models, which include specific measures to ensure 
transparency and accountability in the decision-making process, are more 
effective.81 Therefore, no one stakeholder—such as the government, private 
institutions, or the community—should exclusively govern forests. A case study 
conducted in Nepal concerning decentralized governance in the Terai conservation 
area revealed that participation needs to be built into an institutional mechanism in 
order to: (1) improve the access to information and knowledge of those in low 
income households, and (2) promote more interaction between less powerful 
residents and the government.82 In terms of forest conservation, recognizing the 
 
73. Priscila. F. M. Lopes et al., Suggestions for Fixing Top-Down Coastal Fisheries 
Management Through Participatory Approaches, 40 MARINE POL’Y 100, 109 (2013). 
74. Dirk J. Roux et al., Top-Down Conservation Targets and Bottom-Up 
Management Action: Creating Complementary Feedbacks for Freshwater Conservation, 26 
AQUATIC CONSERVATION: MARINE & FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS 364, 377 (2016).  
75. Id. 
76. Roux et al., supra note 74. 
77. Id. 
78. Bir Bahadur Khanal Chhetri et al., Community Forestry in the Hills of Nepal: 
Determinants of User Participation in Forest Management, 30 FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 6, 
12 (2013). 
79. Luciana Porter-Bolland et al., Community Managed Forests and Forest 
Protected Areas: An Assessment of Their Conservation Effectiveness Across Tropics, 268 
FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 6, 14 (2012). 
80. See Andersson et al., supra note 47, at 70.  
81. Pushpendra Rana & Ashwini Chhatre, Beyond Committees: Hybrid Forest 
Governance for Equity and Sustainability, 78 FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 40, 49–50 (2017).  
82. See Agrawal & Gupta, supra note 30, at 1111.  
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socio-economic needs of the locals, acknowledging tenure rights,83 and 
strengthening local practices and customs will benefit nature conservation 
positively.84 
Meanwhile, under the umbrella of conservation policy, understanding human 
or social dimensions could improve conservation outcomes.85 This approach will 
reduce conflicts or the opposition to conservation initiatives.86 For instance, 
Swedish national park governance policy was exclusively geared towards nature 
conservation, excluding human demands.87 This approach triggered conflict with 
local land users88 and resulted in a change of national park policy toward increasing 
local involvement and promoting local interests, local needs.89 Studies such as 
those in Sweden illustrate that successful governance of a national park requires 
local practices and customs to be “fully incorporated within the designation process 
and subsequent park management.”90 The question is not whether co-management 
works, but rather, under what conditions it can be used to successfully govern 
natural resources.91 Furthermore, conservation initiatives need to be able to identify 
and take into account heterogeneity in community groups and build trust between 
stakeholders, otherwise, we are just paying lip-service to nature conservation.92  
The initiation of a nature conservation in any discipline raises the challenge 
of compliance and conflict.93 Compliance with the rules of conservation initiatives 
is a key factor for success.94 Additionally, participatory processes are essential 
 
83. Porter-Bolland et al., supra note 79, at 6. 
84. Lina Holmgren et al., Protected Area Governance in Sweden: New Modes of 
Governance or Business as Usual?, 22 LOCAL ENVT.: INT’L J. JUST. & SUSTAINABILITY 22, 
34 (2017). 
85. Nathan J. Bennett et al., Conservation Social Science: Understanding and 
Integrating Human Dimensions to Improve Conservation, 205 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 
93, 104 (2017).  
86. Id. 
87. See Holmgren et al., supra note 84, at 22  
88. Holmgren et al., supra note 84, at 22 
89. Holmgren et al., supra note 84, at 33. 
90. Holmgren et al., supra note 84, at 34. 
91. Simo Sarkki et al., Local People and Protected Areas: Identifying Problems, 
Potential Solutions and Further Research Questions, 14 INT’L J. ENVT. & SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. 299, 309 (2015).  
92. Id. at 308. 
93. Jennifer N. Solomon et al., Detecting and Understanding Non-Compliance with 
Conservation Rules, 189 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 1, 2 (2015).; Adrian Arias, 
Understanding and Managing Compliance in the Nature Conservation Context, 153 J. 
ENVTL. MGMT. 134, 134 (2015). 
94. Chiara Bragagnolo et al., Understanding Non-Compliance: Local People’s 
Perceptions of Natural Resource Exploitation Inside Two National Parks in Northeast 
Brazil, 40 J. NAT. CONSERVATION 64, 73 (2017). 
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features of bottom-up governance of nature conservation initiatives because they 
are a way to remedy the lack of support and compliance of top-down conservation 
processes.95 Participatory processes are a promising solution for resolving social 
and environmental challenges.96 Nevertheless, participatory processes raise 
concerns about power plays between stakeholders and about equality among 
different stakeholders, this also holds true for community groups.97 As a 
participatory process, relationships among stakeholders are important. Interactions 
within a social network have a strong, often overlooked, influence on the tendency 
of stakeholders to participate in a policy that affects livelihood.98 Trust plays an 
important role in the success or failure of the relationship.99 
 
III. Linking contract governance theory to bottom-up nature 
conservation governance 
 
So far, our analyses of empirical and theoretical studies revealed that nature 
conservation requires a functioning governance framework to ensure compliance. 
This is difficult to establish in political “hotbeds” if one looks only to traditional, 
state-centered governance solutions.100 Social factors, such as the stabilization of 
trust among stakeholders, also play an important role in the successful bottom-up 
governance of a nature conservation.101 In the absence of available state-centered 
solutions, the success of collective action situations largely depend on the 
willingness of actors to cooperate, which in turn strongly relates to their 
 
95. See Oyanedel et al., supra note 65, at 185. 
96. James Reed et al., Integrated Landscape Approaches to Managing Social and 
Environmental Issues in the Tropics: Learning from the Past to Guide the Future, 22 
GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 2540, 2545 (2016). 
97. Pina Lena Lammers et al., The Challenges of Community-Based Conservation in 
Developing Countries – A Case Study from Lake Alaotra, Madagascar, 40 J. NAT. 
CONSERVATION 100, 109 (2017); Susan Chomba et al., The Political Economy of Forest 
Entitlements: Can Community Based Forest Management Reduce Vulnerability at the 
Forest Margin?, 58 FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 37, 45 (2015). 
98. Roy J. Lewicki et al., Models of Interpersonal Trust Development: Theoretical 
Approaches, Empirical Evidence, and Future Directions, 32 J. MGMT. 991, 997–98 (2006); 
Scott D. McClurg, Social Networks and Political Participation: The Role of Social 
Interaction in Explaining Political Participation, 56 POL. RES. Q. 448, 457–58 (2003).  
99. Latifou Idrissou et al., Trust and Hidden Conflict in Participatory Natural 
Resources Management: The Case of the Pendjari National Park (PNP) in Benin, 27 
FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 65, 65 (2013); Adam Liljeblad et al., Determinants of Trust for 
Public Lands: Fire and Fuels Management on the Bitterroot National Forest, 43 ENVTL. 
MGMT. 571, 571 (2009); Lewicki et al., supra note 98, at 992. 
100. See Black, supra note 7, at 4. 
101. See HARKES, supra note 8, at 42–43. 
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expectations of the behaviors of the other members in the cooperation.102 Trust can 
be pivotal for achieving such cooperation.103 Trust can also lead to expectations 
that others will reciprocate and when these expectations are met long-term 
obligations may develop.104 In complex circumstances, such as the management of 
nature conservations, causal and legal attributes can be essential to creating reliable 
expectations that stabilize patterns of interaction and thereby systemic trust. 
Contracts may be assigned an important governance role of coordinating 
collaboration between actors where collective action problems arise and are also 
of a transboundary nature (such as in nature conservation initiatives).105 Contracts 
may work best outside of a state-centered governance framework, whose regulative 
function is determined by enabling the “social glue” via the required 
cooperation.106 The management of ecosystems and ecosystem services on which 
nature conservation rely upon are embedded into complex contractual 
arrangements. Contractual networks require governance devices to monitor and 
steer the web of relationships.107 These networks can be designed as relational 
contracts,108 where compliance is built on mutual trust.109 Legal tools, such as 
rights and principles, can ensure that trust in contractual relations will be rewarded 
and opportunistic behavior, which may work against achieving the common 
objective, will be punished.110 Such tools involve, for example, provisions that 
ensure the transfer of information, open communication, and risk sharing.111 To 
enforce trust-related obligations, courts have developed implied duties between 
contracting parties that allow for certain remedial measures where breach of an 
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Capital and the Collective Management of Resources, 302 SCI. 1912, 1913 (2003). 
103. Elinor Ostrom, Analyzing Collective Action, 41 AGRIC. ECON. 155, 158-59 
(2010). 
104. See Pretty, supra note 102, at 1913.  
105. T. K. Das & Bing-Sheng Teng, Between Trust and Control: Developing 
Confidence in Partner Cooperation in Alliances, 23 ACAD’Y MGMT. REV. 491, 495–96 (1998).; 
Utkur Djanibekov et al., Understanding Contracts in Evolving Agro-economies: Fermers, 
Dekhqans and Networks in Khorezm, Uzbekistan, 32 J. RURAL STUD. 137, 140 (2013). 
106. See Bradach & Eccles, supra note 18, at 106.; Macaulay, supra note 18, at 65; 
Satria et al., supra note 18, at 233 (illustrating how contractual arrangements can incentivize 
sustainable behavior in the fisheries sector). 
107. Cafaggi, supra note 3, at 67–68. 
108. See Macneil, supra note 16, at 720–21.  
109. Boyle, supra note 17, at 638; Gil et al., supra note 17. 
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implied duty occurs.112 Beyond that, legal scholarship increasingly identifies 
rights, duties, and other non-legal regulatory instruments that cope with trust 
problems. Their impact on trust in the bottom-up establishment and governance of 
a nature conservation initiative has not been researched. As the use of bottom-up 
approaches increases, there is an urgent need for research on trust as a successful 
governance mechanism. 
In contractual theory, contracts can take a variety of forms: formal or 
informal, written or verbal, and implicit or explicit.113 Within the governance of 
nature conservation initiatives, we can find many of these different forms of 
contracts as well. West Papua is the only political “hotbed” in the world we know 
of which already uses contracts for the establishment of a conservation initiative.114 
The type of contract that stakeholders use in West Papua are formal contracts.115 
To be able to test out theoretical underpinnings empirically, we also focus on 
formal contracts as a starting point in this paper. Formal contracts have the 
following two features: 116 First, contractual clauses confer a form of control over 
the contracting parties and, second, they create opportunities that arise from the 
rights granted by the contract.117 Long-term contracts in particular have the ability 
to create trust among the contracting parties;118 however, they also necessitate trust 
to control potential opportunistic behavior.119 Thus, contracts can be viewed as a 
sign of commitment and a tool for coordination.120  
Interpreting contracts through such a lens opens up the possibility to 
investigate contracts as a governance tool for nature conservation in political 
“hotbeds.” If these “hotbeds” feature a lack of efficient government involvement—
which nature conservation requires for effective governance and trust-building 
mechanisms—formal contracts may serve as an adequate substitute. The 
subsequent questions then arise: How should one design these contracts? Which 
framework shall be established to safeguard their effective regulatory function? 
 
112. See Boyle, supra note 17, at 647.  
113. See generally Stanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits 
of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 691–719 
(1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 1119, 1119–58 (1990); Stuart L. Hart, A Natural-Resource-Based View of the Firm, 
20 ACAD’Y MGMT. REV. 986, 986–1014 (1995).  
114. See Fatem et al., supra note 10, at 700; Gunaisah et al., supra note 10, at 900. 
115. Id. 
116. Rosalinde Klein Woolthuis, Trust, Contract and Relationship Development, 
26(6) ORG. STUD. 813, 818 (2005). 
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118. Bradach & Eccles, supra note 18, at 107–08.; Macaulay, supra note 18, at 64. 
119. Woolthuis et al., supra note 116, at 814. 
120. Gómez, supra note 18 at 25. 
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Across markets around the world the use of long-term and networked 
contracts steadily increases.121 In contract law theory, many of these functions have 
been studied in several settings. By looking into the functions that work best to 
facilitate nature conservation in political “hotbeds,” we can rely on a rich source of 
literature governing many situations. The governance of nature conservation and 
the general literature on formal networking contracts share a common feature, 
namely that the underlying transactions are so complex that formal contracts cannot 
possibly cover all contingent circumstances.122 In complex contexts, contracts 
should be more general and take into account uncertainty.123 While such a lack of 
clear-cut rules may be viewed as an impairment to the steering capacity of a 
contract, it can also be identified as a means to enforce trust among the parties.124 
Contracts play a pivotal role in trust dynamics, reinforcing each other in either 
positive or negative ways.125 Long-term contracts require constant social 
interaction to preclude opportunistic behavior by engaging in trust-building 
capacities.126 When contracts are organized in a network, such as in the bottom-up 
governance of nature conservation, these social interactions need not be designed 
to cover only the two parties involved in an exchange contract, but rather the whole 
network.127 
The contractual relationships needed for the governance of nature 
conservation run parallel to what has been described in contractual networks theory 
as a “multilateral contract.”128 “Multilateral contracts are used to coordinate 
parties’ activities in order to pursue common objectives.”129 They “are generally 
chosen when a higher level of coordination is necessary, when information 
exchange needs to be centralized, and when monitoring occurs through common 
technological platforms.”130 Each of these features describe what has been 
identified earlier in the description of the bottom-up governance of nature 
 
121. Gómez, supra note 18 at 25. 
122. Mick Moore, How Difficult Is It to Construct Market Relations? A Commentary 
on Platteau, 30 J. DEV. STUD. 818, 819 (1994). 
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125. See De Vries et al., supra note 123, at 316–17.  
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conservation.131 Turning to the governance features of these multilateral contracts, 
decisions are usually made based on consensus,132 although voting power is often 
delegated to a committee or board.133 The contractual networks involve rules on 
information sharing, participation, the prohibition of unfair competition, and 
decision-making.134 Enforcement mechanisms often rely on naming and 
shaming.135 While a considerable amount of literature exists on the description of 
these contractual networks (scoping), little empirical work exists on their 




Contractual networks and relational contracts share essential features with 
the process that are described in theoretical and empirical work as bottom-up nature 
conservation. A participatory process that engages the various stakeholders and 
stimulates their involvement is key for successful governance of conservation 
initiatives through contract. Social mechanisms play an essential part in ensuring 
such conservation governance works. Legal scholarship also assigns governing 
features to contractual networks, which can be used to tackle problems associated 
with the bottom-up nature conservation. Hence, contractual networks and the 
governance tools assigned to them have the potential to serve as an effective 
governance framework to bottom-up nature conservation. Additionally, 
contractual networks also have big potential to become a successful governance 
tool for bottom-up approaches towards the establishment of nature conservation in 
political “hotbeds” because of their trust-enabling function and their ability to 
function in the absence of state-centered governance systems. While we have 
demonstrated the potential of contract governance as a superior governance tool 
for the bottom-up establishment of nature conservation, currently there is no 
empirical research to prove this claim. We encourage those engaged in this field to 
consider conducting this type of research. In particular, research into which 
contractual governance tools work towards the common goal of nature 
conservation establishment is imperative. This literature review has shown that the 
success of contractual tools is likely measured on the degree to which they are able 
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